01 · Equity deep-dive — synthesized analyst desk
ZIM
$27.27 ▼ 22% below the $35 agreed bid
NYSE · CONTAINER SHIPPINGMKT CAP ≈ $3.29B52-WK $12.33 – $29.97AS OF AUG 6, 2026

Shareholders voted 97% to sell. A prime minister said it is “not on the agenda at all.”

ZIM trades at $27.27 against a $35.00 all-cash bid its own holders already approved — a 28% gross spread that is not antitrust risk, not financing risk, but a single sovereign veto held by the State of Israel. Behind the deal sits a ~2%-share carrier with ~94% of its fleet on charter, a freight-rate spike that already peaked on July 9, and a world orderbook at 31–35% of the existing fleet. Five analyst lenses, three scenarios, four horizons.

The verdict · TL;DR
One question decides the stock: does Israel's golden share block the $35 exit — and if it does, is the ZIM left behind worth $30 in a rate spike or $12 in a supply glut? This is not a valuation; it is a probability wearing a price tag. The distribution is two-humped, the mean is a number the stock will almost never print, and the sell-side consensus (≈$21) sits below the market — because most published targets predate the February bid. Asymmetric, but political.
5-yr · prob-weighted
$35
+30% vs $27.27
52-week sounding · where the tape sits ◆ Berthed between a bid and a veto
$27.27 · Aug 6, 2026 · 66% of the way to the bid Hapag-Lloyd bid $35.00 · +28%
$12.33 · 52-wk low $29.97 · 52-wk high
◦ sell-side consensus $21.06below the market (5 analysts, Aug 6, 2026)
The voyage chart · actual price 2024 → today, then the cone to 2031
HISTORICALBULLBASEBEARPROB-WTD
$70$56$42 $28$14$0 202420252026 202720282029 20302031 $35.00 · agreed bid $17.74 · ’24 peak $12.33 · 52-wk low Feb ’26 · $35 bid $29.97 high Jul ’26 · veto threat $35 $60 $36 $14 TODAY · $27.27

Gray line = ZIM's actual price into today: a $5.72 low in 2024, an autumn-2025 52-week low of $12.33, the near-vertical re-rating on the Feb 17, 2026 announcement of Hapag-Lloyd's $35 cash bid, a $29.97 high, then the July 6, 2026 break when Israel's defence establishment signalled it would veto. Coloured paths are synthesized scenario midpoints, not forecasts — probability-weighted base 45% · bull 25% · bear 30%. An important structural note: in any completed-takeover branch the shares convert to cash and stop compounding, so the 2/3/5-year figures in those branches are the proceeds held flat. Only the deal-breaks branches contain a living equity beyond 2027 — which is why the base path is nearly horizontal. Olive dashed line = the $35.00 agreed bid.

Re-weight the scenarios

Everything here reduces to one judgment call: how likely is the Israeli cabinet to let this deal through? So make it yours. Drag to set the bear and bull probabilities (base takes the remainder); the blended target, the dotted line on the chart above, and the prob-weighted row of every scenario card update live.

30% bear 45% base 25% bull
Blended 5-yr expected $35 +30% vs $27.27
$1.40B
Q1’26 Revenue · −30% YoY
−$0.71
Q1’26 Diluted EPS
$313M
Adj. EBITDA · −60% YoY
$1,310
Avg freight rate / TEU · −26%
866K
Carried volume TEU · −8%
$235M
Free cash flow · −70% YoY
1.7×
Net leverage · from 1.3× at YE25
0.86×
Price / book · $31.73 BVPS
02 · The panel — five ways to read the same tape

Five analyst lenses, targets from $18 to $36

The same facts support a 34% loss or a 32% gain depending entirely on which framework you trust — a spread far wider than a normal equity, because this is not a normal equity. Each lens below is a synthesized expert perspective with its own 12-month target and its own reason to think the others are wrong.

Event-Driven / Merger Arb

Priced for the Veto

A 28% gross spread on a 97%-approved cash deal annualizes to ~30–60% depending on the outside date — no antitrust spread on earth pays that, so essentially all of it is Israeli golden-share risk. Solving $27.27 = p×$35 + (1−p)×B implies a break price of roughly $20–24 at any sane odds. But that anchor is February's ZIM, priced when spot was 60% lower. And "deal dies" ≠ "no bid": Maersk ($29, no Gulf shareholders) and the all-Israeli Sakal group ($37.50) are both circling.

12-MO TARGET $32 · prob-weighted across bid outcomesCONVICTION: MEDIUM — unmodelable veto, rising floor
Deep Value / FCF & Assets

Below Book, Above Cash

0.86× book ($31.73 BVPS), $1.63B of cash, and — critically — what screens call "$5.5B of debt" is ~98% capitalised charter hire, not funded borrowing. There is no maturity wall to trip. ZIM has paid $48.42/share in dividends since its 2021 IPO against a $27 stock. Reverse-engineer Q1: breakeven is ≈$1,415/TEU; against a spot market at $4,255/FEU, a 30–50% lift in realised rate against a fixed charter book is worth $8–16 of EPS.

12-MO TARGET $36 · $2.4B mid-cycle EBITDA × 3.0×CONVICTION: HIGH — floored by cash and book
Cyclical Bear / Short-Seller

The Supply Wall Cometh

The orderbook is 31–35% of the existing fleet — the highest since 2010 — with ~3.0M TEU delivering in 2027 against 2.5–3.5% demand growth, while 2025 scrapping was 8,172 TEU across twelve ships, a twenty-year low. Cape-of-Good-Hope routing absorbs ~9% of world capacity; Suez normalisation hands it all back. ZIM has ~2% share, no terminals, no contract stickiness, and just lost its CEO. The deal is the only thing holding the tape.

12-MO TARGET $18 · 30% × $35 + 70% × $10.70CONVICTION: HIGH — supply is contracted, deal is political
Macro / Geopolitical Strategist

War Premium, Steel Glut

This is not a cycle turn — it is a routing shock inside a structural downturn, and it has already rolled over. Drewry's index peaked at $4,639/FEU on Jul 9 and has fallen three straight weeks to $4,255 (Jul 30) while Hormuz is still disrupted and peak season is still on. US containerised imports ran −2.0% YoY in H1. The cruel part: the same variable sets both the freight rate and the deal outcome — escalation lifts rates and hardens the veto.

12-MO TARGET $28 · weighted across geopolitical branchesCONVICTION: MEDIUM — sure on supply, blind on Iran
Quant / Technical & Factor

Two Ports, No Middle

The return distribution is two-humped — ~$35 above, ~$15 below, almost nothing between — so a "price target" is not a meaningful object here. A two-point solve implies 61% deal odds, which is exactly the breakeven Kelly probability: the tape is priced to zero edge. Price sits at the 85th percentile of its 52-week range, +121% off the low, above all four major moving averages — and that bullish reading is an artifact of an arb clamp, not a trend.

12-MO TARGET $27 · ≈0% probability mass at its own meanCONVICTION: HIGH on shape, LOW on the point
03 · Wall Street's read

Sell-side targets — and why they sit below the price

The unusual fact about ZIM: consensus is beneath the market. That is not a bearish signal so much as a coverage artifact — four of the six targets below predate the February 2026 bid, only two to five analysts still publish, and there is not a single Buy rating in the book.

Consensus ≈ $21.06 (−23% vs today) · range $8.70–$31.80 · zero Buy ratings
BUYHOLDSELL
JP Morgan $8.70 Barclays $15.80 Jefferies $20.00 Fearnleys $20.00 Goldman Sachs $21.00 Citigroup $31.80 TODAY · $27.27 $35 Hapag bid $29 Maersk $37.50 Sakal

Individual sell-side 12-month targets with dates: JP Morgan Underweight $8.70 (Dec 1, 2025) · Barclays Underweight $15.80, raised from $13.70 (Mar 16, 2026) · Jefferies Hold $20.00 (Dec 8, 2025) · Fearnleys Hold $20.00, upgraded from Sell (Dec 19, 2025) · Goldman Sachs $21.00, raised from $15 (Jan 14, 2026) · Citigroup Neutral $31.80 (Feb 19, 2026). Consensus varies materially by source — $16.75 (WallStreetZen, 2 analysts), $19.33 (Jul 19, 2026), $21.06 (Public.com, 5 analysts, Aug 6, 2026), $22.92 (GuruFocus, 5 analysts), $24.95 (stockanalysis.com, 4 analysts). We show $21.06 as the most recent. The three grey/olive reference lines are takeover bids, not analyst targets — the real price discovery in this name has been done by acquirers, not by research desks. Firms and targets as published; ratings shown are the firms' own.

04 · Price scenarios — 1 / 2 / 3 / 5 years

Where the voyage ends

Synthesized scenario midpoints, dated mid-year, with returns measured against today's $27.27. These are illustrative frameworks, not predictions. Note how flat the base path is beyond year one: in a completed takeover the shares become cash and stop compounding — a structural feature of control situations that a normal DCF hides.

1 Year

Mid-2027
Bull$42+54%
Base$31+14%
Bear$16−41%
Prob-wtd$29+7%

2 Years

Mid-2028
Bull$50+83%
Base$32+17%
Bear$13−52%
Prob-wtd$31+13%

3 Years

Mid-2029
Bull$53+94%
Base$33+21%
Bear$12−56%
Prob-wtd$32+16%

5 Years

Mid-2031
Bull$60+120%
Base$36+32%
Bear$14−49%
Prob-wtd$35+30%
Bull case — 25% — show the assumptions & math
Hormuz stays disrupted or escalates, Suez normalisation slips into 2028, and ZIM's realised rate finally catches the spot market it lags by one to two quarters. Charter hire is fixed, so incremental rate is near-pure margin. Either the board can then credibly refuse anything under $40, or a bidder pays up to get it.
Realised rate $1,310 → ~$1,965/TEU (+50%) on ~3.55M TEU = +$655/TEU × 3.55M ≈ +$2.3B EBITDA → ≈ $3.6B Adj. EBITDA, ≈ $16 EPS $3.6B × 2.5–3.0× EV/EBITDA = $9.0–10.7B EV − $2.93B net debt ÷ 120.5M sh ≈ $50–65 · we take $42 at 1yr (realisation lag), $60 at 5yr Precedent: FY2024 printed $1,891/TEU and $17.82 EPS. This is not hypothetical.
Base case — 45% — show the assumptions & math
A control transaction completes, but not necessarily this one and not necessarily at $35. Israel forces a re-cut with a larger New ZIM carve-out; or Maersk (no Gulf sovereign shareholders, prior $29 bid) steps in; or the all-Israeli Sakal group closes at $37.50. Weight those outcomes and blend against a standalone ZIM that has quietly deleveraged into the H2'26 rate catch-up.
~65% control outcome × ~$33 blend ($29 Maersk / $35 Hapag / $37.50 Sakal) + ~35% standalone × ~$28 ≈ $31 at 12 months Beyond year 1 the deal branches are CASH — flat, not compounding. Standalone branch: ~$1.5B of net-debt paydown by mid-2027 ≈ $12/sh of mechanical equity accretion at a flat enterprise value. 5-yr $36 ≈ cash proceeds plus the standalone tail, not a growth multiple.
Bear case — 30% — show the assumptions & math
The veto holds, Hapag walks, and no interloper closes at a premium because by then the rate spike has deflated and the steel has arrived. Suez normalises, releasing ~9% of world fleet capacity back into a market already absorbing ~3.0M TEU of 2027 deliveries. ZIM's fixed charter book — including ten long-term LNG vessels fixed at cycle-elevated rates — runs the operating leverage backwards.
FY2027E Adj. EBITDA ≈ $1.0B × 4.2× = $4.2B EV − $2.93B net debt ÷ 120.5M sh ≈ $10.70 standalone Blend with a residual deal chance: 0.30 × $35 + 0.70 × $10.70 ≈ $18 at 12mo Then $12–14 through 2029–31 as the glut clears slowly. Reference: the pre-bid "unaffected" price was $15.50 in Aug 2025 — in a BETTER rate environment, at 1.3× leverage, with a dividend and a CEO.
Why the market's own implied odds matter more than any of this
You can back out what the tape already believes without any model at all. Solve $27.27 = p × $35 + (1−p) × B for the break price B:
p = 60% → B = $15.68 p = 50% → B = $19.54 p = 40% → B = $22.12 p = 30% → B = $23.96 Inverting at B = $15.50 (the Aug-2025 unaffected price) → p ≈ 60% Boundary condition worth sitting with: if standalone ZIM is worth MORE than $27.27, the implied deal probability goes NEGATIVE. The spread exists only because the market marks the break price low — and it marks it low using a February 2026 freight market.
The quant lens adds the sting: with a win of +28% and a loss of −45%, breakeven Kelly probability is 61.4% — identical to the market's implied 61.4%. At consensus odds there is no position. You only earn one by disagreeing with the cabinet.
05 · Follow the cash

Revenue, capex, free cash flow & debt ($B)

The asset-light illusion in one picture: capex is almost invisible because ~90–94% of the fleet is chartered, not owned — so the capital cost shows up in the slate debt bar as capitalised lease liability instead. At year-end 2025, funded borrowings were roughly $90M; essentially all of the rest was charter hire.

Annual revenue, capex, FCF & total debt · 2023 → 2026E
REVENUECAPEXFREE CASH FLOWTOTAL DEBT
$0$2.5$5.0$7.5$10 2023202420252026E estimated

Revenue (sky) has round-tripped from $12.6B in 2022 to $5.2B in 2023 to $8.4B in 2024 and back to $6.9B in 2025 — this is the most cyclically violent top line in large-cap transport. Free cash flow (olive) peaked at $3.54B in 2024 and was $2.08B in 2025; TTM is $1.54B and Q1'26 alone was $235M, down 70% YoY. Capex (clay) is a rounding error by design — but that is the chartering model, and the cost reappears as the slate debt bar. Sources disagree on "net debt": ZIM reports $2.93B on its own definition; stockanalysis.com shows $3.85B lease-inclusive, giving an EV of $7.14B and EV/EBITDA of 3.9× rather than 2.9×. We flag the conflict rather than pick a flattering one. 2026E is an illustrative desk estimate, not company guidance — ZIM has withheld FY2026 guidance because of the pending merger.

06 · Earnings power

The EPS ladder — or rather, the rollercoaster

Price targets are an EPS estimate times an exit multiple. Here is the earnings path underneath them — and here is why any P/E you read on ZIM is a lie. Four consecutive years: +$38.35 → −$22.42 → +$17.82 → +$3.98. No multiple survives contact with that.

Diluted EPS · reported vs. desk estimate, 2022 → 2029E
REPORTEDDESK ESTIMATE
$40$30$20$10$0−$10−$20 20222023202420252026E2027E2028E2029E $38.35 −$22.42 $17.82 $3.98 $1.20 $3.20 $2.40 $3.00

Gray = reported diluted EPS; olive = a desk base-case estimate, not consensus — because consensus here has effectively broken down. On FY2026 alone, stockanalysis.com carries +$7.89 while WallStreetZen carries +$0.29 (range −$0.93 to +$1.98), with FY2027 at −$2.99 and FY2028 at −$4.50. That is an ~$8 spread of estimate on a $27 stock, and it is the single most honest fact in this report: nobody can model a chartered-fleet carrier through a rate spike. Q1'26 printed −$0.71. The bull's $42 target is roughly $14–16 of 2027 EPS at 2.5–3×; the bear's $18 assumes the ladder never leaves the floor. Both are arithmetically available from this chart.

07 · Growth scorecard

Everything reported is red. Everything quoted is green.

Usually this chart shows a company growing while its stock falls. ZIM inverts it: every line the company reported in Q1 2026 collapsed, while the spot market it sells into doubled. ZIM's realised rate lags spot by one to two quarters — so the entire debate is whether the clay bars flow into the terracotta ones before the orderbook arrives.

Year-over-year change by metric · reported Q1 FY26 vs. the live freight market
ZIM REPORTED (Q1’26)SPOT MARKET
0% −100%−50%+50%+100% Adjusted EBIT −101% Free cash flow −70% Adjusted EBITDA −60% Revenue −30% Realised rate / TEU −26% Spot WCI vs Jul 9 peak −8% Carried volume (TEU) −8% Spot WCI · YoY +61% Spot WCI · since late Jan +102%

Terracotta = ZIM's own reported Q1 2026 year-over-year changes (May 20, 2026 release). Clay = Drewry's World Container Index. The market moved from $2,107/FEU in late January 2026 to a peak of $4,639 on July 9 — and has since fallen three straight weeks to $4,255 on July 30, while the Strait of Hormuz is still disrupted and peak season is still running. That last fact is the bear's sharpest point and it belongs on the same chart as the bull's: rates that cannot hold under maximum disruption are unlikely to hold without it. ZIM realised $1,310/TEU in Q1; Q2 results land August 19, 2026 — with no conference call, no guidance and no Q&A, because of the pending merger.

08 · The debate

Bull vs. Bear

The whole argument compresses into one disagreement: is the $35 bid a floor that a cabinet will eventually accommodate, or a ceiling that a cabinet has already removed?

▲ THE BULL CASE

  • A signed, shareholder-approved $35 cash deal. 97% holder support, unanimous board approval, +58% over the Feb 13 close and +126% over the $15.50 unaffected price. The buyer has not walked.
  • Three bidders, not one. Maersk bid $29 and is preparing a contingency with no Gulf sovereign shareholders; the all-Israeli Sakal group bid $37.50 in May with a $250M employee bonus and Israeli-control pledges. "Deal dies" does not mean "no bid."
  • The break price is being marked with stale data. The market's implied floor of ~$20–24 is February's ZIM — when spot was ~$2,100/FEU. It is now $4,255, and ZIM's realised rate lags spot by one to two quarters.
  • Extreme operating leverage, upward. Charter hire is fixed; breakeven reverse-engineers to ≈$1,415/TEU. Every +$100/TEU on ~3.6M TEU is ~$360M of near-pure EBITDA. FY2024 printed $1,891/TEU and $17.82 of EPS — this is not hypothetical.
  • 0.86× book, and the "debt" is not debt. $31.73 book value per share, $1.63B cash, and roughly 98% of the $5.5B debt figure is capitalised charter hire — no maturity wall, no covenant trip-wire, no acceleration.
  • The board is provisioning for standalone. It hired an operating CEO effective July 1 and pushed his multi-year comp package through an EGM on July 28 — three weeks after Netanyahu's "not on the agenda." You do not do that for a company you expect to disappear in four months.

▼ THE BEAR CASE

  • A sitting prime minister said no. Netanyahu: "not on the agenda at all." Defence Minister Katz threatened to formally exercise the golden share. This is a sovereign national-security veto — no theory of harm to litigate, no statutory clock, no remedy that binds a cabinet, no appeal.
  • The objection is unfixable. Israel's problem is that Qatar (12.3%) and Saudi Arabia (10.2%) own ~25% of the acquirer. You cannot divest your way out of your own cap table. And the formal filing to Israel's Government Companies Authority still had not been made as of mid-March.
  • The supply wall. Orderbook at 31–35% of the existing fleet, the highest since 2010; ~3.0M TEU delivering in 2027 against 2.5–3.5% demand growth; 2025 scrapping of 8,172 TEU across twelve ships was a twenty-year low.
  • The Suez unwind is a matter of when, not if. Cape routing absorbs ~9% of world capacity. Maersk has already made its first transit in ~two years. Normalisation hands that capacity straight back and deletes roughly 10% of effective global demand.
  • The spike is the wrong kind of catalyst. A Hormuz blockade premium is violent, mean-reverting and already fading — the WCI is 8% off its July 9 peak while the disruption persists. Long-term contracts are simultaneously being signed down 25% on Far East–Med.
  • No moat, and a fixed cost base. ~2% share, ~94% chartered, no owned terminals, no contract stickiness, priced off an index it cannot influence — and ten long-term LNG charters fixed at cycle-elevated rates run the leverage backwards. One quarter of loss took net leverage from 1.3× to 1.7×.
  • The register is the tell. 58% retail, 0.33% insider, an EVP selling ~61,000 shares at $24.63–$26.20 in June into a supposedly-closing $35 deal, zero Buy ratings, and a low target of $8.70.
09 · Risk map

Risk map — likelihood × impact

Where each risk sits over a three-to-five-year horizon, not just how big it is. Note that ZIM is unusual: two separate risks occupy the hot likely × high corner — one political, one industrial — and they are not independent of each other.

Low impact
Medium impact
High impact
Likely
  • Spike fades
  • No dividend
  • Golden-share veto
  • Supply wall
Possible
  • Gov. vacuum
  • Charter trap
  • Suez reopens
  • No rival bid
Tail
  • Legal limbo
  • War / hull loss

Golden-share veto kills the exit

Likely × High

What breaks: Israel formally blocks the transfer, Hapag walks, and the ~28% deal premium evaporates in a single session — straight through every technical support level, with only 2.5% short float to cushion the gap.

Orderbook supply wall

Likely × High

What breaks: ~3.0M TEU of 2027 deliveries into 2.5–3.5% demand growth collapses freight rates below ZIM's ≈$1,415/TEU breakeven, and a ~94%-chartered cost base cannot flex down with them.

Suez normalisation

Possible × High

What breaks: Red Sea transits resume at scale, releasing the ~9% of world fleet capacity currently absorbed by Cape routing and deleting roughly 10% of effective global demand overnight.

No interloper appears

Possible × High

What breaks: Maersk's $29 and Sakal's $37.50 are indications, not financed offers. In a rate downcycle they get re-cut rather than re-raised, and the "three bidders" floor turns out to be one.

Regional escalation / hull loss

Tail × High

What breaks: ZIM is the flag carrier of a state at war. A vessel loss, a war-risk insurance withdrawal or a port-access denial reprices the equity overnight — low odds, uninsurable consequence.

Rate spike mean-reverts

Likely × Medium

What breaks: The WCI is already 8% off its July 9 peak with Hormuz still disrupted. If the premium fully deflates before ZIM's realised rate catches up, the H2'26 earnings recovery never arrives.

Dividend stays at zero

Likely × Medium

What breaks: Policy pays up to 50% of net income; a loss means nothing. Income screens still hold ZIM on a stale 4.6% trailing yield against a forward yield of zero — a mechanical forced-seller overhang at rebalance.

Charter-cost trap

Possible × Medium

What breaks: Ten long-term 11,500 TEU LNG dual-fuel charters fixed in 2025 at cycle-elevated rates become unavoidable fixed cost through a downturn, converting the asset-light story into an operating-leverage trap.

Litigation limbo

Tail × Medium

What breaks: A 97%-approved deal blocked by the state invites shareholder suits and a multi-year standstill in which ZIM is neither acquired nor free to run itself as a normal public company.

Governance vacuum

Possible × Low

What breaks: A CEO change on July 1, no FY2026 guidance, and an August 19 earnings release with no conference call and no Q&A — dispersion has nowhere to collapse, so the print becomes a volatility event.

10 · Plain-language glossary

The jargon, decoded

Hover the dotted terms in the metrics above, or scan the desk's working definitions here.

TEU / FEU
Twenty- and Forty-foot Equivalent Unit — the standard container measures. Volumes are quoted in TEU; spot freight indices like Drewry's are quoted per FEU.
Realised rate per TEU
What ZIM actually collected per container, blending spot and contract cargo. It lags the spot index by roughly one to two quarters — the central timing question in this report.
Chartered capacity
Ships leased rather than owned — about 90–94% of ZIM's fleet. Keeps capex tiny but turns charter hire into a fixed cost that cannot flex down when rates fall.
Golden share
A special share the State of Israel holds in ZIM, giving it veto rights over a sale and the ability to requisition vessels in an emergency. It is a sovereign national-security instrument, not a regulatory review.
Deal (merger) spread
The gap between the market price and the agreed takeover price. Here $35.00 − $27.27 = $7.73 — 28% of the share price, or 22% of the deal value — compensation for the risk the deal never closes.
Orderbook
Ships on order at shipyards, expressed as a % of the existing fleet. At 31–35% it is the highest since 2010 — supply that is already contracted and will arrive regardless of demand.
Blank sailing
A scheduled voyage a carrier cancels to withdraw capacity and defend freight rates. A rising count signals carriers fighting weakness.
Adjusted EBITDA
Operating profit before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation. For a charterer it flatters things, because much of the "depreciation" is really lease expense.
Free cash flow
Cash left after running and investing in the business. ZIM's trailing $1.54B against a $3.29B market cap is a ~47% yield — a number that says more about where earnings were than where they are.
Net leverage
Net debt divided by trailing EBITDA. ZIM's went 1.3× → 1.7× in one quarter — not because debt rose, but because the denominator collapsed.
Exit multiple
The valuation multiple assumed at the end of a forecast. Multiply it by projected earnings or EBITDA to get a target price. Container shipping trades at low single-digit EV/EBITDA precisely because the E is unreliable.
Prob-weighted
Each scenario's price multiplied by its probability, summed into one expected value. In a two-humped distribution like this one, the expected value is a price the stock will almost never actually print.